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E.R.I.S.A. SUBROGATION AS
INTERPRETED WITHIN THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT - A ROADMAP FOR MANAGING

FIRST DOLLAR RECOVERY
GREGORY PITTS*
THE PROBLEM

Lawyers representing injury victims now wrestle with this
thorny scenario.' A new client consults about a collision in which
he was blind-sided in an intersection. The client was severely
injured, underwent multiple surgeries, and incurred medical
expenses already exceeding $100,000. He is still in treatment and
will likely suffer permanent disability. The at-fault driver has
only $100,000 of liability insurance coverage. When the lawyer
asks if the medical expenses have been paid, the client happily
reports that his employer's health plan has paid everything.
Unbeknownst to the client, in what seems to him a clear cut case,
alarms are going off inside the lawyer's head in anticipation of
what may terrorize both of them: ERISA subrogation. 2
*J.D. Candidate, 2003.
B.B.A. in Finance from The University of
Wisconsin - Madison. I would like to thank my father, James, for his insight
on this issue and the inspiration to tackle this profession and life in general. I
would like to thank my mother, Elise, for her encouragement in all I pursue,
and my wife, Leigh, for her patience and constant support.
1. See Martha Neil, ERISA: Employee Benefits Law is Thorny As Ever,
and Recent Changes Mean Lawyers Need to be Doubly Careful When Trekking
Through the Brambles, A.B.A. J., June 2001, at 54 (providing a real life
example of the rigid effects of an Employee Retirement Income Securty Act
("ERISA") plan's subrogation rights). Two New Jersey lawyers represented a
9-year-old boy who was severely burned by an exploding aerosol can that was
thrown into a bon fire. Id. The boy incurred over $1.2 million in medical
expenses, which were paid by his parents' ERISA plan. Id. The plaintiffs
settled the case for $600,000 but a federal judge decided the ERISA plan's
subrogation rights entitled it to recover all $600,000. Id. The ERISA plan
barred the injured boy from recovering any of the proceeds. Id. It also barred
the attorneys from collecting contingent fees because no fund was available
after the ERISA plan executed its first dollar priority. Id.
2. ERISA, prescribed under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq. (2000), is a set of
federal laws that governs self-funded employee benefits programs. Among its
many provisions is 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2000), which provides federal
preemption over any State laws that "relate to any employee benefit plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2000). This authorizes fiduciary plans to preempt State
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Today, personal injury lawyers are reluctant to accept such
cases on the customary contingent fee basis because they are
aware of the problems presented by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), enacted by Congress in 1974.3 In
the above hypothetical, the $100,000 of liability coverage would
likely be collected from the at-fault driver without much dispute.
However, both the client and attorney risk receiving nothing if the
client's health plan is governed by ERISA. The health plan may
be entitled to first dollar priority over any proceeds recovered by
the client under its right to subrogation for medical expense
payments.4 If the health plan already paid over $100,000 in
medical expenses for the client, the health plan could take all of
the $100,000 settlement pursuant to its own right of subrogation
prescribed in the plan. The attorney's lien for fees may be
subordinate to the health plan's lien, and the permanently
disabled client may never see a penny of the proceeds from his own
5
case.
This Comment seeks to provide a roadmap for managing
ERISA subrogation within the Seventh Circuit. Part I discusses
general issues to address when one confronts what appears to be
an ERISA plan, and proposes ways to preclude ERISA
subrogation. Specifically, Part I discusses the following issues: (A)
the creation and applicability of federal and state common law,6
such as the "make whole" and "common fund" 8 doctrines; (B)
whether the plan is indeed self-funded; 9 (C) whether the plan is
subrogation laws and create their own rights to recovery of benefits paid. Id.
3. See Neil supra note 1, at 54-55 (stating that attorneys need to be on the
lookout for ERISA issues); see also Earl Mettler, SubrogationRights of ERISA
Plans, TRIAL, Sept. 2000, at 57 (warning lawyers about the effects of ERISA
and explaining how ERISA authorizes fiduciary plans to create provisions that

preempt state subrogation laws, including attorney's liens for fees).
4. See Neil supra note 1, at 55 (stating that ERISA generally limits a plan
participant's entitlement to recovery).
5. Id.
6. See Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the adoption of a federal common law rule preventing full
reimbursement by ERISA plans).
7. See David M. Kono, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Health Insurer
Pockets - A Vote for National Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make
Whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REV. 427, 448-50 (2000) (explaining the

equitable effects of the "make whole" doctrine and proposing its uniform
application to all ERISA subrogation claims).
8.See Wal-Mart Stores v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the common fund doctrine is a basic legal principle that
entitles an attorney hired by one party to collect fees on a fund obtained for

the benefit of several parties).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5) (2000)(requiring a plan to be completely selffunded in order to be covered by ERISA). The exact meaning of "self-funded"
is an issue that is left somewhat open. See discussion infra at Part II. Also,

note that this statute denies coverage to governmental and church plans,
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seeking equitable relief or legal damages;10 and (D) whether the
plan can remove its claim to federal court."
Part II of this Comment considers several issues that require
scrutiny of the actual plan language, including: (A) whether the
plan specifically provides for first dollar priority;" (B) the
applicability of the plan's subrogation rights to the proceeds; 3 (C)
whether there is a conflict between the actual plan language and
the summary plan description;'4 and (D) the plan administrator's
under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) and (2) (2000), respectively.
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000) (providing that a plan is only entitled

to seek equitable relief in a civil action). The issue of whether enforcement of
subrogation rights provides an equitable remedy, or whether it provides legal
breach of contract damages, is a novel one. The Ninth Circuit ruled that a
claim seeking to enforce subrogation rights is a claim for legal damages not
permitted under ERISA. See generally FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d
1258 (9th Cir. 1997); affd by Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 202 F.3d 1246 (9th
Cir. 2000). See infra note 58, for further explanation of the case. On January
8, 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an ERISA subrogation
claim seeking to impose personal liability on the beneficiary for a contractual
obligation to repay the plan constituted a claim for legal damages, which was
not authorized by ERISA. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204, 122 S.Ct. 708, 712-13 (2002). The Supreme Court's decision
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Id. This decision will significantly affect
ERISA subrogation claims and plan language in the future. The issue of
whether a subrogation claim constitutes appropriate action for equitable relief
under ERISA, or simply a prohibited legal claim for breach of contract
damages, should now be more widespread in the Seventh Circuit. See
discussion infra at Part III.
11. The Seventh Circuit in Speciale v. Seybold, 147 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir.
1998), followed its earlier decision in Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., 115 F.3d
493, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1997) by holding that it was improper for an ERISA plan
to remove the case to federal court in order to adjudicate liens. Speciale, 147
F.3d at 616. The ERISA plans' claims for subrogation were defenses to state
claims seeking to apportion funds, and, therefore, the federal courts lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the claim did not arise under federal law.
Id.; see also Blackburn, 115 F.3d at 494-95.
12. See Sanders v. Scheideler, 816 F.Supp. 1338, 1347 (W.D. Wis. 1993),
affd by unpublished order, 25 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
common law make whole doctrine would be applied where a self-funded plan
failed to assign priority rules to third party proceeds of settlement); see also
Schultz v. NEPCO Employees Mut. Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 441, 44546 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that where an ERISA plan failed to set forth
first dollar priority rules for third party settlements, the federal common law
make-whole rule would apply).
13. See Employers Health Ins. Co. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 469 N.W.2d 172,
177 (Wis. 1991) (holding that a health insurer was not entitled to enforce
subrogation rights against proceeds collected from the insured's uninsured
motorist policy because the health plan's subrogation rights only applied to
funds recovered from a "responsible third party," which the court determined
did not include the insured's own automobile carrier).
14. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (2002) (requiring all ERISA plans to provide
participants with a summary plan description ("SPD")); see also Subrogation
and Reimbursement Provisions Must Be Explained in SPDs Under DOL
Regulations, THOMPSON

PUBLISHING

GROUP,

Jan.

2001,

available at
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discretion to interpret the plan language.15
Personal injury lawyers must be familiar with these issues
when dealing with ERISA plans in order to maximize their clients'
recoveries, and preserve their own fees.16
I.

HISTORY OF SUBROGATION IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES

Subrogation is based on the common law equitable doctrine
that allows a party to gain priority over another party having a
legal right or claim against a third party. 17 Insurance companies
or self-insured employers paying their injured beneficiary's
medical expenses often assert a right of subrogation over their
beneficiary's legal claim against the third party that caused the
injuries. In essence, the payor of benefits steps into the shoes of
the injured person and collects the benefit legally owed to that
person. 8 Although the right is derived from common law equity,
today most claims base subrogation on conventional contractual
principles.' 9
Subrogation has become controversial because of its effect on

www.thompson.com (discussing the recent regulations issued by the U.S.
Department of Labor that require plans to accurately explain their
subrogation rights in their SPDs).
15. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)
(noting that if the plan fails to expressly confer discretion on the administrator
to interpret the plan, a court may apply a de novo standard of review); see also
Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding the plan
trustees were given discretion over interpretation of terms).
16. See Neil supra note 1, at 54-55 (referring to ERISA as a "[h]ornets'
[niest" for unwary lawyers who have been victimized by ERISA subrogation).
17. 16 RONALD A. ANDERSON & MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE
2D § 61:36 at 118-19 (2nd ed. Rev. 1983); see also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN
I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(a)(1) (1988) (explaining how subrogation is
based on equitable doctrines of common law). Subrogation is based on the idea
that one who pays the expense of another is entitled to collect from the third
party that caused such expense. ANDERSON & RHODES, supra at § 61:2. This
prevents a debtor, or subrogor, from double recovery, on the grounds that if
the subrogor were allowed to receive benefits from the creditor, or subrogee, he
should not then be able to collect again from the third party that caused the
original injury. Id. at § 61.18 at 93. The concept of subrogation is similar to
the ordinary understanding of reimbursement, in that a creditor is entitled to
repayment when the debtor obtains funds. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1440 (7th ed. 1999) (defining subrogation as "[tihe substitution of one party for
another whose debt the party pays, entitling the paying party to rights,
remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the debtor"). See id. at
1290 (defining reimbursement as "repayment" or "indemnification"). Note
that for the purposes of this Comment, no distinction will be made between
the two concepts.
18. 16 ANDERSON & RHODES, supra note 17, § 61:36 at 118.
19. Id.; see id. § 61:2-3 at 75 (distinguishing legal and conventional
subrogation on grounds that conventional subrogation is originated by
contract, while legal subrogation "arises by operation of law").
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the resolution of lawsuits.
Most states recognize the collateral
source rule, 21 a rule adopted to ensure an injured party receives
the total value of his or her loss. 2 This rule holds a tortfeasor
liable for all damages, notwithstanding payments by a third
party. 23 From a tort victim's perspective, subrogation sometimes
frustrates the collateral source rule by preventing the victim from
collecting all damages incurred. 4 If the payor of benefits has a
right to subrogation, it is the payor, not the victim, who will collect

20. See Roger M. Baron, Subrogation:A Pandora'sBox Awaiting Closure,
41 S.D. L. REV. 237, 238 & 263 (1996) (explaining the history of subrogation
and its harsh effects on personal injury cases today, including the windfalls for
insurers that collect premiums from insureds, yet recoup all benefits provided
upon recovery by the insureds).
21. See Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Collateral Source Rule: Injured
Person's Hospitalization or Medical Insurance as Affecting Damages
Recoverable, 77 A.L.R.3d 415, 422 (discussing the general adoption of the
collateral source rule and its effect on preserving full compensation for
damages despite health insurance payments); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
256-57 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the collateral source rule as follows: "The
doctrine that if an injured party receives compensation for its injuries from a
source independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from
the damages that the tortfeasor must pay.").
22. See Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630 N.W.2d 201, 214-15 (Wis. 2001) (holding
"the limitation is contrary to ... the collateral source rule"); Ellsworth v.
Schelbrock, 611 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Wis. 2000) (holding that the collateral
source rule permits the injured party to collect the total value of his losses,
and the amount of damages awarded is not reduced because the injured party
received compensation from another source such as insurance).
23. Koffman, 630 N.W.2d at 214-15.
24. See generally Michelle Andrews, Adding Insult to Injury: It's bad
enough being hurt in an accident, but these days, health plans and hospitals
are compounding the pain by claiming big parts of victims' settlements,
SMARTMONEY, July 1, 2000, at 130 (documenting several stories of individuals
who were severely injured, collected from the tortfeasors, and were shocked to
discover they had very little, if anything, coming to them personally due to the
subrogation rights of their insurers). The lead story involves a 35-year-old
man named Ridler who was hit head-on by an out-of-control minivan while
riding his motorcycle only a block away from his home. Id. at 133. The
accident left him severely crippled with multiple fractures and soft-tissue
injuries. Id. Doctors questioned whether he would ever walk again. Id.
Ridler settled his case against the adverse driver for $450,000 while he
remained hospitalized. Id. Ridler's pain was admittedly increased, however,
upon learning that he would only be entitled to $29,000 of the settlement after
attorney's fees and subrogated liens were deducted. Id. Ridler's health
insurer had a subrogated right to $406,000 for medical expenses it paid, which
was unavoidable in his jurisdiction. Id. Although the stories mentioned in the
article do not involve ERISA plans, the subrogation clauses were just as
effective because the cases proceeded in jurisdictions that did not recognize
the make whole doctrine that would have prevented the majority of insurers
involved from exercising their subrogation rights. The injured insureds in this
article questioned why they are required to pay premiums when their insurers
simply recoup their payments. Id. The article provides a view of subrogation
from a personal and practical perspective. Id. at 133-36.
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from the tortfeasor."
This can be particularly frustrating to
victims who, upon notice of such subrogation, justifiably question
why they paid premiums to the subrogor."6 From the perspective
of injured victims, subrogation may not seem so equitable after
all.27 Nevertheless, it remains a vital concept in many areas of
insurance law. 8
The response of some states to the discordant effects of
subrogation is evident by their enactment or adoption of several
common law doctrines, such as the make whole doctrine29 and the
common fund doctrine. 30 These doctrines mitigate some of the
harsh
effects
of conventional
subrogation
by creating
circumstantial exceptions to subrogation language in insurance
policies or other contracts allowing for subrogation.
The make whole doctrine holds that a subrogated party
cannot recover for payments rendered on behalf of an injured
party unless or until the latter has recovered proceeds sufficient to
compensate him for all damages in order to make him "whole"
again. 1 This doctrine protects victims in situations where the
tortfeasor only has a limited amount of insurance coverage from

25. Id. at 133.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 133-36.
28. See Baron, supra note 20, at 238-39 (noting that subrogation existed
without significant opposition in matters involving property insurance, but
has now expanded to the health and automobile insurance industries).
29. See id. at 249-50 (listing the make whole doctrine as one doctrine
created by state courts, which was designed to ameliorate the harshness of
subrogation); see also Kono, supra note 7, at 449-50 (explaining the equitable
effects of the make whole doctrine and proposing its uniform application to all
ERISA subrogation claims); see generally 16 ANDERSON & RHODES, supra note
17, § 61:64 at 145-46 (explaining that no right of subrogation exists against
the insured where compensation received by the insured is less than the
actual loss).
30. See Baron, supra note 20, at 255-56 (listing the common fund doctrine
as another doctrine created by state courts in order to ameliorate the
harshness of subrogation); see generally 16 ANDERSON & RHODES, supra note
17, § 61:47 at 132 (explaining that litigation expenses, including contingent
attorney fees, are paid out of the fund recovered before paying any money to
the subrogated insurers).
31. See Cutting 993 F.2d at 1297-98 (weighing the pros and cons of the
make whole doctrine that bars subrogation until the tort victim is fully
compensated for his injuries). Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh
Circuit, discussed the plaintiffs request for federal common law adoption of
the make whole doctrine. Id. at 1296. Judge Posner explained that the rule
prohibits enforcement of subrogation rights until the "plan beneficiary has
been made whole for the loss giving rise to the claim for benefits." Id.; see
Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348, 355-56 (Wis. 1982)
(adopting the make whole rule in Wisconsin and preventing an automobile
insurance carrier from recovering medical payments made to its insured on
the grounds that the insured was not fully compensated by the tortfeasor's
liability insurer).
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which to collect." For example, in the above hypothetical, the
client would collect the total $100,000 from the tortfeasor's
insurance (less attorney fees) since he clearly was not fully
His medical expenses alone
compensated for his damages.
exceeded the amount recovered. Hence, the client was not made
whole by the recovery, therefore his subrogated payor of benefits
This doctrine has been
was not entitled to reimbursement.
recognized, although not always applied (because of state law
inconsistencies) in all circuits, as an effective bar to subrogation
claims.33 It ensures that the injured party will receive all damages
to the extent available before the payor of benefits is reimbursed.34
The common fund doctrine protects attorneys representing
injured parties from subrogation rights otherwise jeopardizing
their fees.35 It permits an attorney to collect a contingent fee on a
common fund collected through his own efforts for the benefit of
several parties. 38 An attorney collecting from a tortfeasor often
must distribute the proceeds to the injury victim and any
additional parties with liens on such proceeds. The common fund
doctrine allows an attorney to enforce his fee agreement as a lien
superior to the fund before other liens are paid.37 This prevents
subrogated parties from reaping all the benefits a tort victim's
attorney has produced. For example (again referring to the above
hypothetical), this doctrine would prevent the subrogated health
plan from taking all $100,000 from the tortfeasor before the
attorney collects his contingent fee share.
These two doctrines act as an established equitable check on
subrogation by protecting an injured person's right to recovery
from a tortfeasor and preserving attorney fees. 38 However, they
32. See Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1298 (stating how the make whole doctrine
prevents leaving the tort victim with an uncompensated injury).
33. See 16 ANDERSON & RHODES, supra note 17, § 61:64 at 145-46

(explaining the make whole rule and providing numerous citations to various
circuits that follow it); see also Baron, supra 20, at 249-50 (noting that the
make whole doctrine is the majority view).
34. See Rimes, 316 N.W.2d at 356 (noting that where the tort victim's
damages "exceeded those received in settlement, the [victim] was not made

whole" and the subrogated insurer was not entitled to any of the settlement
proceeds).
35. See Neil, supra note 1, at 54 (demonstrating how attorneys who
obtained a $600,000 settlement on behalf of a burn victim were barred from
collecting their contingent fees because ERISA said the money goes to the
health insurance company).
36. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the common fund doctrine is a basic principle that entitles the
lawyer hired by one party to collect fees on the common fund he created for the

benefit of several parties).
37. Wells, 213 F.3d at 402.
38. See Agitation Over Subrogation and Coordination of Benefits, ERISA
LITIG. REP., October 1997, at 10 (complaining, from an ERISA plan's
perspective, about the participants' lawyers' "joyful" discovery of how the
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have occasionally been neutralized;
burgeoned with the enactment of ERISA.

and

subrogation

has

II. ERISA ALTERS THE PLAYING FIELD
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA as a set of federal laws to
govern multi-state employers with self-funded employee benefit
programs.39 The ostensible purpose was to provide a uniform set of
laws protecting employers from inconsistent state laws affecting
their employee benefit program, that were threatened by prior
laws.40 ERISA added protection and stability to beneficiaries and
interstate commerce by setting uniform standards of conduct and
reporting requirements for fiduciary plans.4'
Although ERISA encompasses numerous provisions governing
fiduciary plans, it does not specifically establish subrogation rights
for such fiduciaries 2 ERISA is silent on subrogation, but it does
provide that a plan shall be enforced according to the terms of the
plan documents.4 ' The private contractual provisions set forth in
plan documents preempt certain state laws."
Congress specifically prescribed for fiduciary plan provisions
to "supersede any and all State laws" that "relate to any employee
benefit plan." 5 Courts commonly refer to this as the "preemption
clause."46 Although various courts interpret the phrase "relate to"
differently,47 this provision is regularly interpreted to allow
make whole and common fund doctrines make it easier to subvert subrogation
claims).
39. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)-(c)(2000) (codifying ERISA).
40. See LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 7:9

at 7-19 (1997) (explaining the many purposes and policies of ERISA).
41. Id.
42. See Sanders v. Scheideler, 816 F.Supp. 1338, 1345 (W.D. Wis. 1993)

(stating that, "ERISA itself does not establish the terms upon which benefits
are paid or reimbursed"); see also Carpenter v. Modern Drop Forge Co., 919 F.

Supp. 1198, 1201 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (stating that, "ERISA does not speak
directly to the issue of subrogation rights").
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000)
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) states:

Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [1003(a) of this
title] and not exempt under section 4(b) [1003(b) of this title]. This
section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.

Id.
45. Id.

46. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 363 (1999); FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990) (discussing the breadth of 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a)'s "preemption clause").
47. The phrase "relate to" has been the subject of much debate far beyond

the scope of this Comment. The Supreme Court addressed the issue in several
renowned opinions, including Holliday, 498 U.S. at 57-8; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
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fiduciary plans to maintain first dollar priority over recoveries
made by injured participants, notwithstanding attorneys fees
liens, make whole doctrines, or any other contrary state law
claims.48 ERISA plans are given free reign to incorporate strong
subrogation provisions into the plan language, which state laws
cannot circumvent.4 9 In other words, state laws protecting tort
victims from non-ERISA insurers and health plans do not apply to
ERISA plans.0
Congress enacted two additional provisions known as the
"savings clause"5' and the "deemer clause"52 that narrow the
breadth of ERISA preemption. 3 The savings clause provides that
any state law that "regulates insurance" is exempted or saved
from preemption.' Congress intended this clause to preserve the
Dedeauz, 481 U.S. 41, 43-7 (1987); and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738-40 (1985). For more information on the
differing interpretations of the phrase, see Horace Green, Developments in
ERISA Preemption and Standard of Review, THE BRIEF, Spring 2001, 59, at
59-60 (discussing how the phrase "'relate to' is too broad to be [a] useful"
measure, and explaining the courts' attempts to clarify the statute).
48. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 65 (holding that ERISA preempted a
Pennsylvania statute that precluded subrogation in actions arising out of the
use of a motor vehicle); see also Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1296-99 (noting that any
common law that prevents a subrogated party from full reimbursement would
be preempted by clear ERISA plan language requiring full reimbursement
without deduction).
49. See Ronald B. Grayzel, Subrogation, NEW JERSEY LAW., June 2001, 22,
at 23 (stating that, "[wihile the federal statute [ERISA] does not convey a right
of subrogation, the plans have a right to incorporate a repayment provision in
their enabling documents").
50. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 65 (holding that an ERISA plan is not subject
to a state statute governing insurance companies).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (stating: "[e]xcept as provided in
subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve
any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities").
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)(2000) states:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [1003(a) of
this title], which is not exempt under section 4(b) [1003(b) of this
title] (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer,
bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the
business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts,
banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
Id.
53. See generally Ward, 526 U.S. at 363, 373-78; Holliday, 498 U.S. at 5765; and Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 732-748 (discussing the effects of, and
interaction between, the "savings clause" and the "deemer clause," prescribed
under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) and 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000), respectively).
54. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that ERISA does not
preempt any state law that "regulates insurance"). Whether a law "regulates
insurance" is subject to much debate, which, like the preemption clause, is
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states' lawmaking power over the insurance industry as a whole.55
The deemer clause provides that no fiduciary plan shall be deemed
to be an insurance company within the scope of any state law
purporting to regulate insurance companies or insurance
contracts.56 This clause modified the savings clause by explicitly
prohibiting fiduciary plans from being treated as insurance
companies for purposes of state insurance law.57
These statutes continue to generate considerable controversy

beyond the scope of this Comment. However, the Supreme Court has created
an analytical framework for determining whether a law falls within the
savings clause, beginning with a common-sense interpretation of the clause.
See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 740 (using a common-sense view of the phrase);
See Ward, 526 U.S. at 367 (stating that precedent provides a framework for
interpreting the phrase, starting with a "common-sense view"). The second
step involves a three-factor test to determine whether a law fits within the
"business of insurance," as that phrase has been interpreted by the McCarranFerguson Act, prescribed under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000), and enacted in
1948 to regulate insurance. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743; see also 15 U.S.C. §
1011 (2000) (declaring the policy of the Act). A law is interpreted to regulate
insurance if: (1) the law "transfer[s] or spread[s] a policyholder's risk"; (2) the
law affects "an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
insured"; and (3) the law is "limited to entities within the insurance industry."
Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743. In Metro. Life, the Supreme Court held that a
Massachusetts mandated-benefit statute requiring minimum mental
healthcare benefits be provided to an insured was a law that "regulates
insurance" and was not preempted by ERISA. Id. at 746. The Court also
noted that there is a "presumption against preemption," and "that [courts] are
not inclined to read limitations into federal statutes in order to enlarge their
preemptive scope." Id. at 741. In Ward, the Supreme Court held that a
California notice-prejudice law, prohibiting an insurer from denying an
untimely claim unless it can show it was prejudiced by the delay, was saved
from preemption because it regulated insurance. Ward, 526 U.S. at 363, 373.
In both cases, the Supreme Court analyzed the law under the framework
described above.
55. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (holding that the common sense
understanding of the savings clause means that "in order to regulate
insurance, a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but
must be specifically directed toward that industry").
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)(2000) (reciting the deemer clause).
57. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 62 (following Metro. Life by holding that the
deemer clause was intended to prevent benefit plans from being deemed as
insurance companies for the benefit of protection under the savings clause).
The Supreme Court explained that it was merely preserving Congress's intent
to distinguish insured from uninsured plans. Id. Only insured plans are
subject to state regulation because ERISA governs all qualified uninsured
plans. Id. The Court held that a Pennsylvania statute precluding subrogation
in actions arising out of the use of a motor vehicle was preempted by ERISA.
Id. at 65. The Court acknowledged that the law "regulates insurance" under
the savings clause, but explained that it also fell within the deemer clause. Id.
at 60-61. The Court further explained that the deemer clause was intended to
exclude self-funded ERISA plans from the reach of the savings clause, and
that the plan involved in this case qualified as a self-funded ERISA plan. Id.
at 62.
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in personal injury subrogation law because they drastically change
the rights of all interested parties. On January 8, 2002, the
United States Supreme Court offered its interpretation in a
limited decision to settle the federal circuits' differing
interpretations of ERISA preemption, although it has made the
58
topic increasingly debatable and arguably more complex.
Personal injury lawyers have developed strategies for dealing with
ERISA subrogation 9 that this Comment presents in roadmap
form.
III. WAYS TO PRECLUDE ERISA SUBROGATION
The first step toward managing ERISA subrogation is to
discover ways to preclude its application in the first instance. A
personal injury lawyer should immediately address several issues
when presented with a possible ERISA subrogation claim to unfold
any effective means of barring preemption.

58. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204; 122
S.Ct. 708, 712-13 (2002) (affirming a Ninth Circuit decision barring an ERISA
plan from enforcing its subrogation rights because the plan sought to impose
personal liability on the beneficiary for a contractual obligation to repay the
plan, which did not constitute a claim for equitable relief). This decision
marks the first instance of agreement with, or acceptance of, the Ninth
Circuit's position on the issue. See FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258,
1262 (9th Cir. 1997), affd by Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 202 F.3d 1246, 1249
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that an ERISA plan is not entitled to enforce its
subrogation rights because it is limited to seeking equitable relief under 29
U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3)). These Ninth Circuit opinions provided the most obvious
distinction among the federal circuits prior to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Great-West. The Ninth Circuit held that a claim for
subrogation is actually a claim for legal damages resulting from breach of
contract, which is prohibited by the statute. Owens, 122 F.3d at 1262. The
Ninth Circuit's position has been scrutinized by other circuits prior to GreatWest. See discussion infra at Part III.
59. See Nancy G. Ross and Michael T. Graham, Great-West v. Knudson: The
Impact on Subrogation and Reimbursement Rights and Section 502(a)(3)
Remedies, 15 BENEFITS L.J. 27, at 37-40 (announcing new strategies for
ERISA plans to enforce their subrogation rights in the wake of Great-West).
This article provides an ERISA plan's perspective on the aftermath of GreatWest. It warns ERISA plans to ensure third-party recoveries remain traceable
to the plan beneficiary in order to recover under a constructive trust or
equitable restitution claim. Id. at 37-39. The article advises seeking the
"issuance of preliminary injunction[s]" against beneficiaries to "enjoin
dispersal of the third-party recovery after a... settlement or judgment." Id.
at 38. Attorneys for beneficiaries should be wary of such novel approaches.
See also ERISA LIT. REP., supra note 38, at 10 (expressing concern, from an
ERISA plan's perspective, over legal loopholes that have been discovered by
attorneys for beneficiaries to avoid ERISA subrogation); Ford & Harrison,
LLP, Avoiding the Make Whole Doctrine in ERISA Subrogation Cases, MGMT.
UPDATE, Dec. 1998, v. 20, no. 6 (describing methods for ERISA plans to uphold
their subrogation rights against efforts to suppress such rights by
beneficiaries).
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Utilize Federalor State Common Law When Applicable

An attorney should seek application of federal and state
common law, such as the make whole and common fund doctrines,
when confronted with an ERISA subrogation claim." Although
these doctrines have typically been preempted by ERISA,"1 they
are worth asserting because of their popular acceptance and
equitable effect.6" Indeed, some cases give these doctrines credence

and permit them to govern the ERISA subrogation claim by
creative interpretation and strict construction of ERISA statutes. 3
60. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56 (stating that Congress intended federal
courts to create federal common law to govern the rights and obligations under
ERISA plans).
61. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 65; Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v. T.H.E.
Ins. Co., 523 N.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); and Serembus v.
Mathwig, 817 F. Supp. 1414, 1423 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (holding that Wisconsin's
make-whole doctrine would not be adopted as federal common law for selffunded employee plans subject to ERISA).
62. See Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1297-98 (commenting on the predominant
acceptance of the make whole doctrine and implying that it is a good "thing").
63. See Kavelaris v. MSI Ins. Co., 631 N.W.2d 665, 668-69 (Wis. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that the make whole doctrine satisfied all three McCarranFerguson Act factors, and, hence, was found to regulate insurance in
accordance with the savings clause). This case involved
a claim
for
reimbursement for $130,900.78 of medical expenses paid by an ERISA plan to
an injured tort victim when the victim settled with the tortfeasor's insurer for
its $200,000 policy limits. Kavelaris, 631 N.W.2d at 667. It was undisputed
the victim was not made whole by the settlement. Id. at 668. The issue was
whether ERISA preempted the make whole doctrine and entitled the plan to
full reimbursement. Id. at 667. The court looked to the savings clause that
bars preemption of "any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking,
or securities." Id. at 668, citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)(2000). In order to
determine whether the make whole doctrine regulates insurance, the court
used a "common sense view." Id. citing Ward, 526 U.S. at 367. The court also
cited Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50, which proposed three additional factors derived
from the McCarran Ferguson Act. Kavelaris, 631 N.W.2d at 668. The court
did state, however, that not all three factors were required to prove a law falls
within the savings clause. Id., citing Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,
230 F.3d 959, 969 (7th Cir. 2000). The court applied the three-factor test to
the make whole doctrine. Id. at 668-69. It explained that the doctrine was a
requirement to be followed by the insurance industry and shifted the risk of
recovery from the insured to the insurer. Id. at 669. The doctrine was found
to be an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
insured because it affected the cost of every policy. Id. The court determined
the doctrine was directed at insurance companies and was consistent with the
savings clause. Id. See also Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., 115 F.3d 493,
496 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the common fund doctrine was not preempted
by ERISA, as it is a general law not "related to any employee benefit plan," as
required under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000)). The Seventh Circuit distinguished
the common fund doctrine from the anti-subrogation law held preempted in
Holliday. Blackburn, 115 F.3d at 496. The common fund doctrine's effect on
the ERISA plan was determined to be merely "incidental." Id. See also Wells,
213 F.3d at 404 (holding that the plan was responsible for a pro rata share of
attorney fees incurred by participant in obtaining settlement in personal
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In Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed the pros and cons of the make whole doctrine.'
The court recognized that the make whole doctrine prevents the
tort victim from an uncompensated injury in circumstances where,
without the doctrine, all recovery from the tortfeasor would be
paid to the subrogated plan.65 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that rejection of the make whole doctrine "makes subrogation a lot
like assignment."66 On the other hand, it explained that rejection
of the make whole doctrine might reduce the price of insurance
and enable insureds to obtain more coverage." Nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit declined to take a definitive stance on the issue,
and decided the case on the basis that the plan fiduciary had
administrative discretion
to interpret the plan in the most
68
favorable manner to it.

injury action). Wells was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and her ERISA
plan paid $10,982.61 for her medical expenses. Id. at 400. Wells settled her
case for $75,000 from the adverse driver's insurer, which wrote out separate
checks to Wells's attorney for $25,000, to the ERISA plan for $10,982.61, and
to Wells for the remainder. Id. at 400. Wells instructed her attorney not to
distribute the check to the ERISA plan because it should be held responsible
for a percentage of the attorney fees since it had benefited from collection. Id.
at 400. The court stated:
"The plan documents entitled the [ERISA] plan to reimbursement of 100
percent of any [and all] benefits paid to a participant to the extent of
'any payment resulting from a judgment or settlement, or other
payment or payments, made or to be made by any person or persons
considered responsible for the condition giving rise to the medical
expense or by their insurers."' Id. at 404.
Judge Posner explained that the ERISA plan was a contract that is founded on
basic legal principles. Id. at 402. One basic principle is the common fund
doctrine that entitles the lawyer hired by one party to collect fees on the
common fund he created for the benefit of several parties. Id.
The plan
documents in this case failed to expressly repudiate the common fund
principle. Id. Therefore, Judge Posner was able to hold that the plan did not
alter the background understanding of the allocation of attorney fees. Id.
Judge Posner distinguished several conflicting cases that refused to reduce the
ERISA plan's lien by attorney fees. Id. at 403. He indicated that the plans in
those cases had either included a provision that barred the application of the
common fund doctrine, or expressly authorized the plan's administrator with
discretion to interpret the plan. Id. In cases where the administrator is given
such discretion, the court's review is deferential. Id. Judge Posner noted,
however, that the presumption is against deference and that no reference to
discretion was mentioned in the plan's documents in this case. Id. Therefore,
the court held that Wells was entitled to a pro rata reduction of the
subrogation lien for attorney fees. Id. at 404.
64. See Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1297-98 (weighing the pros and cons of the
make whole doctrine as well as the pros and cons of subrogation, and noting
the difficulty in deciding which is the better rule).
65. Id. at 1298.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1298-99; see also discussion infra at Part III.D.
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Several courts have proposed, considered, and even accepted
the adoption of the make whole doctrine as universal common
law.69 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin adopted the make whole doctrine as federal common
law."0 It held that the doctrine serves as a default rule, "consistent
with the congressional mandate to fashion federal common law to
facilitate the ERISA scheme."7 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision in an unpublished opinion,
suggesting
its acceptance of the make whole doctrine as federal
72
law.
Indiana and Illinois are two of the few states that have not
adopted the make whole doctrine.73 Indiana incorporated a pro
rata reduction scheme when apportioning third party proceeds.74
Under this method, a subrogation lien is reduced in proportion to
the uncompensated damages of the plaintiff. For example (again
using the above hypothetical), if the client's damages are $300,000,
but he can only collect $100,000 from the tortfeasor, the
subrogation lien for medical expenses would be reduced by two69. Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1297-98; see also Sanders, 816 F.Supp. at 1347
(adopting the make whole doctrine as federal common law); see also
Hartenbower v. Elec. Specialties Co., 977 F. Supp. 875, 883 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(noting that considerable momentum and precedent exist for applying the
make whole doctrine as a default rule, and holding that the make whole
doctrine would be read into the ERISA plan).
70. Sanders, 816 F.Supp. at 1347.
71. Id.
72. Murzyn v. Amoco Corp., 925 F. Supp. 594, 601 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
73. See id. at 600 (stating that Indiana is unlike the majority of
jurisdictions in that it does not follow the make whole doctrine); Capitol
Indemnity Corp. v. Strike Zone, 646 N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(stating that Illinois declines to adopt equitable principles espoused by foreign
authority, such as the make whole doctrine, so as not to upset the settled
expectations of the parties as expressed in the policy); see also In re Estate of
Scott, 567 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that Illinois has never
made a statement analogous to that of the Rimes court, which adheres to the
make whole doctrine).
74. Murzyn, 925 F. Supp. at 600; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-19. Liens or
claims to diminish in same proportion as claimant's recovery is diminished.
The statute provides:
If a subrogation claim or other lien or claim that arose out of the
payment of medical expenses or other benefits exists in respect to a
claim for personal injuries or death and the claimant's recovery is
diminished: (1) by comparative fault; or (2) by reason of the
uncollectability of the full value of the claim for personal injuries or
death resulting from limited liability insurance or from any other cause;
the lien or claim shall be diminished in the same proportion as the
claimant's recovery is diminished. The party holding the lien or claim
shall bear a pro rata share of the claimant's attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
Id. see also Roy T. Tabor and Sue Rempert, Subrogation Claims and Liens,
TABOR FELS & TABOR, 1, at 5-7 (citing the language changes in Indiana's
statutes governing subrogation and calling them "fair and equitable").

20021

E.R.I.S.A. Subrogation Within the Seventh Circuit

thirds. The subrogated health plan would only receive one-third of
its lien because the client was able to collect only one-third of his
damages.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana adopted and applied the make whole doctrine to an
ERISA subrogation claim as federal law.7" It declined to apply
Indiana's "pro rata" doctrine to ERISA subrogation for fear that it
would undermine the express purpose of ERISA - uniformity
among the states.7 ' The district court determined that the make
whole doctrine was the best approach, in light of the Seventh
Circuit's acquiescence.77
A Wisconsin court of appeals recently upheld the make whole
doctrine and found that it "regulates insurance" within the
meaning of the savings clause."8 Wisconsin recognizes the make
whole doctrine as an essential part of subrogation claims. 79 The
court determined that the make whole doctrine shifts policyholder
risk from the insured to the insurer, an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insured and insurer, and affects the cost
of every insurance policy. 0 This detailed interpretation of the
make whole doctrine should lead to a more liberal construction of
ERISA preemption.
Wisconsin also recognizes the common fund doctrine as an
equitable concept entitling an attorney to be compensated from the
whole fund and those who directly benefit from its accumulation. 8
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin permitted a one-third reduction of an ERISA plan's
subrogated interest to reflect the attorney's fees generated in
obtaining recovery from the tortfeasor.8" The court so decided on
75.
76.
77.
of the

Murzyn, 925 F. Supp. at 601.
Id.
See id. (stating that the legal precedent currently supports application
make whole doctrine to bar ERISA preemption when the beneficiary has

not been fully compensated).
78. Kavelaris, 631 N.W.2d at 668-69.
79. See Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348, 355-56
(Wis. 1982) (adopting the make whole doctrine that prevents an insurer from
obtaining

reimbursement

when

the

beneficiary

has

not been

fully

compensated for underlying tort injuries).
80. See Kavelaris, 631 N.W.2d at 668-69 (holding that the make whole
doctrine satisfied the McCarren-Ferguson Act three prong test).
81. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Geline, 179 N.W.2d 815, 819-21
(Wis. 1970) (adopting the common fund doctrine as an equitable concept

subject to the following conditions: creation of a fund; timely notice to the
subrogated party of the intent to collect fees on the entire fund; lack of joinder
of the subrogated party; and reasonable attorney fees).
82. See Serembus v. Mathwig, 817 F. Supp. 1414, 1423 (E.D. Wis. 1992)

(holding that the subrogation amount should be reduced by one-third because
the ERISA plan benefited from the beneficiary's pursuit of her claims). But see
also Johnson v. Ziegler, 27 Employee Benefits Cas. 2591, 2002 WL 725126, at
*18 (Wis. Ct. App. June 11, 2001) (holding that the common fund doctrine does
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the basis that the ERISA plan would not have recovered anything
but for the attorney's success in the underlying tort action.83
Indiana codified the common fund doctrine in a separate
statute applicable to all subrogation claims by insurers.'
However, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana held that the statute and common law may
preempt ERISA if the plan specifically requires the beneficiary to
pay his or her own attorney's fees.85
Illinois recently permitted the common fund doctrine to
withstand ERISA preemption under some circumstances." The
Illinois Supreme Court held that ERISA did not preempt the
common fund doctrine because that doctrine is a common law rule
of general application, which was outside the scope of ERISA
preemption.87 The court determined that an attorney's claim
under the common fund doctrine was an independent action based

not apply when the ERISA plan, contains an "opt-out" provision specifically
barring its application). This case was decided on April 25, 2002, and has
been recommended for publication.
83. Supra note 82.
84. IND. CODE § 34-53-1-2 states:
An insurer claiming subrogation or reimbursement rights under this
chapter shall pay, out of the amount received from the insured, the
insurer's pro rata share of the reasonable and necessary costs and
expenses of asserting the third party claim. These reasonable and
necessary costs and expenses include and are not limited to the
following: (1) The cost of depositions. (2) Witness fees. (3) Attorney's
fees to the lesser of: (A) the amount contracted by the insured for the
insured's portion of the claim; or (B) thirty-three and one-third
percent (33 1/3%) of the amount of the settlement.
Id.
85. See Carpenter v. Modern Drop Forge Co., 919 F. Supp. 1198, 1206 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) (following Serembus and entitling the beneficiary to a one-third
reduction of the subrogation amount to represent the portion of attorney's fees
incurred in recovering from the tortfeasor); but see Engle v. Wal-Mart Assoc.
Health & Welfare Plan, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1120-21 (N.D. Ind. 1999)
(distinguishing Carpenter on the grounds that the ERISA plan language in
this case specifically required 100% reimbursement, notified participants that
they were responsible for their own attorney's fees, and vested discretion in
the plan administrator to interpret the plan in a light most favorable to the
plan).
86. See Bishop v. Burgard, 764 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ill. 2002) (holding that
ERISA does not preempt the application of the common fund doctrine); see also
Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 668 (Ill. 1996) (holding that the
common fund doctrine's effects on ERISA plans are "too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral" to justify finding that the doctrine "relates to" such plans); but see
Estate of Lake v. Marten, 946 F. Supp. 605, 611, n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(disagreeing with Scholtens and holding that the common fund doctrine affects
the contractual relationship between the ERISA plan and the participant
where the doctrine's only purpose was to reduce the subrogation lien); but see
also Blackburn, 115 F.3d at 495-96 (upholding Scholtens and the application of
the common fund doctrine to ERISA subrogation claims).
87. Bishop, 764 N.E.2d at 29.
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upon the attorney's rights, which was wholly unrelated to the
ERISA plan.' The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the policy
behind the common fund doctrine is to prevent "freeloading" by
subrogated parties.89
An earlier Illinois Supreme Court opinion determined that
the common fund doctrine could not be characterized as an
antisubrogation law because it applies to a wide range of civil
cases.9" The court also noted that the common fund doctrine did
not arise out of any subrogation agreement between the tort victim
and the ERISA plan, but was simply a "quasi-contractual right" to
compensation invoked by the attorney obtaining recovery in the
victim's underlying tort action. 91
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois has explicitly disagreed with the Illinois Supreme Court.92
The district court determined that an action for application of the
common fund doctrine is not an action for unpaid attorney fees
independent of the subrogation claim.9 Rather, the district court
concluded that it was an action to avoid reimbursing the ERISA
plan the full amount of benefits it paid to the tort victim. 94 The
district court noted that the common fund doctrine benefited the
tort victim only by reducing the subrogation lien, and that the
attorney would have recovered attorney fees notwithstanding its
application. 95 Thus, the district court held that the common fund
doctrine did affect the contractual relationship between the tort
victim and the ERISA plan, thereby bringing it within the
preemption authority of ERISA.96
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently clarified
the common fund issue.97 It held that the common fund doctrine
was not preempted by ERISA, and permitted a pro rata reduction
of the medical expense subrogation lien to reflect attorney fees
incurred in generating the settlement.99 The Seventh Circuit held
that the common fund doctrine is a general law not related to any
employee benefit plan.99 It further noted that the doctrine's effect
on ERISA subrogation was merely incidental."' However, the

88. Id. at 32.
89. Id. at 34.
90. Scholtens, 671 N.E.2d at 664.

91. Id. at 664-65.
92. Estate of Lake, 946 F. Supp. at 611, n.5.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Blackburn, 115 F.3d at 495-96 (holding that the common fund
doctrine is not sufficiently related to an ERISA plan to warrant preemption).
98. Id. at 496.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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court did suggest that the plan would have a better argument if its
documents expressly required its participants to pay their own
attorney fees.'' This dicta implies that ERISA plans can obviate
the common fund doctrine by including language sufficient to give
it first dollar priority over all liens." 2 Although attorneys should
be wary of such language once they obtain the actual plan, 3 they
should strive for application of the common fund doctrine early in
the litigation on the substantive grounds discussed above.
The foregoing cases created a self-confessed "web of ERISA
confusion, " ' ° which leaves attorneys ample opportunity to present
novel, yet sound arguments on their clients' behalf. Attorneys for
beneficiaries should argue for application or adoption of state
common law make whole and common fund doctrines in federal
common law to preclude first dollar recovery by ERISA plans.
B. Discover Whether the Plan is Truly Self-Funded
An attorney should always ascertain whether a plan is
actually self-funded, or whether an insurance policy pays its
participants' claims. A plan must be completely self-funded in
order for ERISA preemption to apply."' If a plan purchased
insurance for its participants, state laws regulating the insurance
industry, including the make whole and common
fund doctrines,
16
apply and the plan will avoid ERISA preemption.
The Wisconsin decision of Kavelaris, which saved the make
whole doctrine from ERISA preemption, also ruled that the plan
was not subject to ERISA preemption under the deemer clause
because it was not completely self-funded."7 The court noted that
the employer purchased an insurance policy from a separate
insurance company and paid premiums to cover medical expenses

101. Id.
102. See Johnson, 2002 WL 725126, at *18 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (barring

application of the common fund doctrine pursuant to the ERISA plan's opt-out
provision).
103. See discussion infra at Part III. A. (explaining the importance of

scrutinizing the plan language).
104. Murzyn, 925 F. Supp. at 601.
105. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 61 (stating that only self-funded ERISA plans

are exempt from state regulation, and that an insurance company that insures
a plan remains subject to state laws); see also Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 732

(stating that ERISA plans that purchase insurance are governed by state
insurance regulation).

106. See Kavelaris, 631 N.W.2d at 669 (holding that the plan was subject to
state insurance regulation including the make whole doctrine because the
ERISA plan purchased insurance for its participants).
107. See id. (noting that the deemer clause does not apply to negate the
ERISA savings clause because the ERISA plan was insured under a policy

regulated by Wisconsin insurance laws, which included the make whole
doctrine).
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of its employees. 08 The court differentiated uninsured employee
benefit plans directly governed by federal law from insured plans
governed by state law.'9 The court then held that the make whole
doctrine governed the plan under Wisconsin common law."'
Attorneys must also be mindful of "stop-gap" or "stop-loss"
insurance that is insurance over an underlying limit."' Some
employer plans purchase this form of umbrella insurance to
protect employer assets if an employee should sustain a
catastrophic injury generating massive medical expenses. 2
Although attorneys can make a plausible argument that such a
plan is not completely self-funded, the only case addressing this
issue within the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion."'
The court ruled that a self-funded employee benefit plan with stoploss insurance covering the plan itself, rather than individual
beneficiaries, is not deemed an insurance provider under ERISA,
hence, the plan was not subject to state laws regulating
insurance."' However, it should be noted that the Seventh Circuit
subsequently ruled ERISA does not preempt state laws requiring
state assessments on stop-loss insurers."' This decision may pave
the way for the argument that ERISA should not preempt state
subrogation laws relating to payments made by stop-loss insurers.
Attorneys must promptly discover whether a plan is indeed
self-funded. Such investigation can be made through plan tax
returns and plan language. Correspondence with plan trustees or

108. Id. at 667.

109. Id. at 669.
110. Id.
111. BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY

807

(7th ed.

1999) defines

"stop-loss

insurance" as:
Insurance that protects a self-insured employer from catastrophic losses

or unusually large health costs of covered employees. Stop-loss
insurance essentially provides excess coverage for a self-insured
employer. The employer and the insurance carrier agree to the amount

the employer will cover, and the stop-loss insurance will cover claims
exceeding that amount.
Id.
112. Id.
113. See Ramsey County Med. Center, Inc. v. Breault, 525 N.W.2d 321, 325

(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a self-funded plan is entitled to first dollar
subrogation even though stop-loss insurance coverage existed for catastrophic
losses payable by the plan above a prescribed annual limit).
114. Id.
115. See Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1995)

(discussing the relation between stop-loss insurers and ERISA plans, and
holding that state assessments on insurance policies sold to ERISA plans do
not interfere with the ERISA plan's administration significantly enough to
implicate preemption). The court noted that the state assessments could
reduce the benefits an ERISA plan would offer its participants, but concluded
that the assessments had applied to all insurers and was not sufficiently

connected to ERISA plans. Id.
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administrators, and discovery of all plan documents, including the
summary plan description or booklet, is imperative to verifying the
uninsured and self-funded status of the plan. This step is vital in
determining which laws govern the claim, and will significantly
affect the rights of all involved parties.
C. DistinguishBetween EquitableRelief and Legal Damages
Under ERISA, a plan may only bring a civil action for
equitable relief against a plan participant."8
Attorneys for
beneficiaries may validly argue that a plan seeking enforcement of
its subrogation rights is actually seeking legal damages for breach
of contract, which is not permitted under ERISA."7 The United
States Supreme Court has upheld this argument by affirming a
Ninth Circuit decision on similar grounds."'

116. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000) states:
[A] civil action may be brought...
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the
terms of the plan.
Id. See Great-West, 122 S.Ct. at 713 (stating that "an injunction to compel
payment of money due under a contract, or specific performance of a past due
monetary obligation, was not typically available in equity" and were not
considered equitable remedies permitted under ERISA); see also Mertens v.
Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (discussing equitable relief verses
money damages in ERISA); Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc. v. Wash., 187
F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing legal damages from equitable
relief, and stating that where an ERISA plan seeks either restitution for
breach of fiduciary duty, or imposition of a constructive trust, it is properly
regarded as an equitable remedy).
117. See Great-West, 122 S.Ct. at 719 (holding that an ERISA subrogation
claim seeking to impose personal liability on the beneficiary to pay the plan
pursuant to a contractual obligation was not authorized by ERISA as it did not
constitute a claim for equitable relief); see also Ross & Graham, supra note 60,
at 34-37 (distinguishing available equitable claims from prohibited legal
claims and "conclud[ing] that equitable relief under [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)]
does not include the following: (1) injunctive relief to compel payment of
money past due or (2) 'restitution' of amounts due unless the money, or its
proceeds remain in the possession of the defendant"); The court in Wells
stated:
[A] plaintiff cannot convert a claim of damages for breach of contract
into an equitable claim by the facile trick of asking that the defendant
be enjoined from refusing to honor its obligation to pay the plaintiff
what the plaintiff is owed under the contract and appending to that
request a request for payment of the amount owed.
Wells, 213 F.3d at 401.
118. See Great-West, 122 S.Ct. at 719 (affirming a Ninth Circuit decision
barring ERISA subrogation where the plan sought to impose personal liability
on the beneficiary to repay the full extent of benefits provided). This case
marked the first Supreme Court decision barring ERISA subrogation on the
basis of improper legal relief. Id. at 715. The Supreme Court distinguished
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In Great West, the ERISA plan beneficiary was rendered
quadriplegic from a motor vehicle accident.1 9 The underlying tort
action was settled, and a substantial portion of the proceeds was
set aside in a special needs trust for future medical care pursuant
to state law.'2 ° The rest of the settlement was distributed among
the injured beneficiary, her attorney, Medi-Cal and the ERISA
plan, with the plan recouping only a fraction of its lien. 2' The plan
then sued to collect the entire amount of benefits paid. 2' The
Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment to the beneficiary on
the basis that reimbursement through funds provided by a third
party was not equitable relief permitted under ERISA."' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue. '
The Supreme Court noted that the plan language held the
beneficiary "personally liable to the plan" for any funds not
reimbursed after recovery from a third party."' The Supreme
Court held that equitable relief under ERISA does not encompass
"injunction[s] to compel payment" under a contract, or specific
performance to pay a contractual obligation.1 6
It also
legal damages from equitable relief by using a historical analysis of equitable
remedies. Id. at 712-19. The Supreme Court concluded that "injunction[s] to
compel the payment of money past due.., or specific performance of a past
due monetary obligation, [were] not typically available in equity." Id. at 713.
The Supreme Court also distinguished between equitable and legal
restitution. Id. at 714-17. It determined that equitable restitution is only
permitted when the defendant has possession of something that rightfully
belongs to the plaintiff. Id. at 714. Therefore, an ERISA plan could not
recover money from a beneficiary unless that beneficiary actually had the
money in her possession. Id. at 715. In this particular case, the settlement
proceeds were in possession of a special needs trust set aside for future
medical care, so the ERISA plan had no viable claim for equitable restitution.
Id. See also FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1997), reaffirmed by Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 202 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir, 2000)
(holding that a claim for subrogation by an ERISA plan is actually a legal
claim for breach of contract damages against a beneficiary, which is not
permitted by 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3)).
119. Great-West, 122 S.Ct. at 711.
120. Id.
121. Id. The injured beneficiary settled her underlying tort action for
$650,000.00. Id. The settlement allocated $256,745.30 to a special needs trust
for future medical care pursuant to a California statute; "$373,426.00 to
attorney's fees and costs; $5,000 to reimburse a California Medicaid program;"
and $13,828.70 to the ERISA plan for reimbursement of past medical
expenses. Id. The plan had already paid $411,157.11 for the beneficiary's
medical expenses. Id. The plan never cashed the check received from
settlement, which only amounted to three percent of its total lien, and brought
suit against the beneficiary to recover the full extent of benefits provided. Id.
at 712.
122. Id. at 712.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 711.
126. Id. at 713.
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distinguished equitable restitution from legal restitution by
explaining that the former requires money or property to belong
"in good conscience" to the plaintiff and to be clearly in the
"defendant's possession."21 7 In this case, the settlement proceeds
did not "in good conscience" belong to the plan and were not in the
defendant's possession."8
The Supreme Court noted that a
substantial portion of the proceeds were in the rightful possession
of the special needs trust. 9 This was the critical factor for the
decision because the beneficiary did not have possession of the
proceeds. 3 '
Therefore, the plan could not claim equitable
restitution against the beneficiary and was barred from making
any legal claims under the express language of ERISA.'
Unlike
the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not bar all ERISA
subrogation on this basis, and implied that a plan could still
recoup its payments in equity by seeking to impose a constructive
trust under different facts. 32 Nevertheless, this decision barring
the imposition of personal liability on a beneficiary to reimburse
an ERISA plan has opened the door to another effective argument
against ERISA subrogation.
Courts within the Seventh Circuit have generally upheld
ERISA plan subrogation rights. 133 However, even prior to the
Supreme Court decision, the Seventh Circuit had seemed partial
to adoption of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning.3 1 In dicta, the
Seventh Circuit stated that "money due ... (on] a contract is
'quintessentially an action at law,""3 ' and an ERISA plan could not
make it an equitable action merely by seeking specific
performance of the duty to pay.136
The Seventh Circuit did note that the settlement proceeds in

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
Id.
See Ross & Graham, supra note 59, at 35 (explaining the Supreme

Court's rationale in Great-West that the ERISA plan could not recover under
equitable restitution because the settlement proceeds did not go directly to the
beneficiary, rather to her special needs trust and attorney).
131. Great-West, 122 S.Ct. at 717.

132. Id. at 714.
133. See Admin. Comm. v. Jay, 135 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(enforcing ERISA subrogation rights as an equitable remedy on the grounds
that the ERISA plan language prescribed for "100% repayment of the loan,"
which constituted a "classic instance of restitution."); see also Wells, 213 F.3d

at 401 (enforcing ERISA subrogation on the grounds that the ERISA plan was
seeking to impose a, constructive trust, which is within the concept of equity).

134. See Wells, 213 F.3d at 401 (stating that an ERISA plan cannot convert a
claim for money due on a contract to an equitable claim in order to validate a
claim under ERISA preemption).
135. Id. (quoting Hudson View II Assoc. v. Gooden, 644 N.Y.S.2d 512, 516
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996)).
136. Id.
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the underlying tort action were being held by the beneficiary's
lawyer, presumably in an escrow account." ' The ERISA plan was
seeking to impose a constructive trust on the money that had been
intercepted by the lawyer.'38 The Seventh Circuit explained that a
constructive trust is a "form of equitable relief against someone...
who is holding property that is rightfully the [claimant's].""'
Therefore, the plan was authorized by ERISA to pursue its
subrogation claim against the beneficiary because it constituted a
claim for equitable relief.' °
In making its decision, the Seventh Circuit noted its prior
decision in Admin. Comm. v.. Gauf where the court concluded
that "all claims of reimbursement by an ERISA plan [qualified] as
equitable" claims under its broad preemption clause.14 ' It also
observed that the Ninth Circuit had reached an opposite result in
three decisions, where it held that subrogation claims constituted
legal claims for breach of contract damages.'
Nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit declined to further address the issue, holding that
a suit for constructive trust was well within the concept of
equity.1
Courts within the Seventh Circuit have subsequently
interpreted the United States Supreme Court's decision
differently.'" The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois has upheld an ERISA plan's subrogation rights
under equitable restitution claims, 4 yet denied another plan's
rights asserted under a constructive trust theory. 14
These

137. Id.
138. Id.

139. Wells, 213 F.3d at 401.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see Admin. Comm. v. Gauf, 188 F.3d 767, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a claim for subrogation is a claim for specific performance of a

contract, which is equitable relief authorized by ERISA).
142. Wells, 213 F.3d at 401; see discussion supra note 58 (explaining the
Ninth Circuit opinions in Owens and Ellis).

143. Wells, 213 F.3d at 401.
144. See Ross & Graham, supra note 60, at 37-40 (discussing the impact of
Great-West on subsequent cases, and citing two recent district court opinions
within the Seventh Circuit that came to opposite results with regard to ERISA
subrogation claims).
145. See Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, No. 01-C-8277,
2002 WL 47159, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2002) (distinguishing Great-West and

upholding the ERISA plan's claim for equitable restitution where the plan
sought to recover funds in the beneficiary's possession); see also Primax
Recoveries, Inc. v. Duffy, 204 F. Supp 2d. 1111, 1113 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(distinguishing Great-West and upholding equitable restitution where the
specific funds sought had not yet been received by the beneficiary).

146. See Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, No. 00-C-6869, 2002 WL 58816,
*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2002) (citing Great-West and denying the ERISA plan's
subrogation rights under a constructive trust theory on the basis that it
constitutes a legal claim for the imposition of an obligation to pay money).
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decisions demonstrate the ongoing complexity of and problems
associated with ERISA subrogation claims within the Seventh
Circuit.
Attorneys for beneficiaries may assert that a claim for ERISA
subrogation is actually one for legal breach of contract damages, or
legal restitution, prohibited by ERISA.'47 The Supreme Court
decision has significantly limited an ERISA plan's right to
subrogation by emphasizing the distinction between equitable
relief and legal damages.'48
This decision has provided the
opportunity for the Seventh Circuit to preclude ERISA subrogation
by limiting the scope of available remedies.
D

Prevent Removal to FederalCourt

A plan raising ERISA preemption as a defense is not thereby
entitled to remove a case to federal court.'49 The Seventh Circuit
has ruled that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
state law claims seeking to apportion funds."' In Speciale v.
Seybold, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision and
the ERISA plan paid a majority of the medical expenses.15 ' The
plaintiff brought a state law tort claim against the adverse driver
and settled prior to trial.5 2 The plaintiff filed a motion to
adjudicate liens in state court., 3 The ERISA plan removed the
case to federal court upon assertion of preemption.' The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered
complete reimbursement to the plan."' On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit ruled that removal was improper because the original suit
involved a state law claim, and the ERISA plan had raised its
preemptive status as a defense to a motion brought within a state
law case."' The court stated, "The issues raised in the plaintiffs
complaint, not those added in the defendant's response, control the
litigation.""17 The court held that while ERISA confers complete
preemption in actions brought by plan participants to recover
147. See Great-West, 122 S.Ct. at 719 (barring ERISA subrogation where the
plan sought to impose personal liability on the beneficiary for failure to
reimburse the plan pursuant to a contractual obligation).
148. Id. at 717-19.
149. See Speciale v. Seybold, 147 F.3d 612, 616-17 (7th Cir. 1998), (following
Blackburn, 115 F.3d at 494-95 (7th Cir. 1997) stating "emphatically that
removal under ERISA preemption was improper based on the well-pleaded
complaint rule.").
150. Speciale, 147 F.3d at 617.
151. Id. at 614.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.

156. Speciale, 147 F.3d at 616-17.
157. Id. at 614 (quoting Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d
1482, 1486 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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benefits, it does not apply to defenses raised by a plan."' The
court reversed and remanded the case back to state court for
adjudication of the liens under state law.'59
This holding authorizes state trial courts within the Seventh
Circuit to adjudicate liens on settlements of or judgments on state
law claims. Attorneys should submit motions to adjudicate liens
in state court actions when an ERISA subrogation claim is
identified, and assert the "well-pleaded complaint" rule' when the
ERISA plan seeks removal to federal court in its responsive
pleading. Pursuant to the latest Seventh Circuit decisions, a court
should prohibit removal when only an apportionment of funds
issue is presented in conjunction with a state law cause of action.16 '
IV. SCRUTINIZE PLAN LANGUAGE FOR LOOPHOLES
If an attorney realizes that ERISA subrogation cannot be
obviated on general grounds, the next step is to scrutinize the
ERISA plan language for alternative means of negating the
subrogation claim. Several issues, when raised, may effectively
preclude an ERISA plan from first dollar recovery, or at least force
it to prove entitlement to the proceeds.
A

Look for FirstDollarPriority

It is imperative to scrutinize the plan's policy language to
determine if in fact it provides for first dollar priority. As
discussed above, some courts have adopted the make whole
doctrine as a default common law rule applicable when a selffunded plan fails to assign priority to third party settlement
proceeds.' 62 If an ERISA plan merely includes a right to recovery
158. Speciale, 147 F.3d at 615-16.
159. Id. at 617.
160. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 279 (7th ed. 1999) defines a "well-pleaded

complaint" as follows:
An original or initial pleading that sufficiently sets forth a claim for
relief- by including the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, the basis for
the relief claimed, and a demand for judgment - so that a defendant
may draft an answer that is responsive to the issues presented. A wellpleaded complaint must raise a controlling issue of federal law for a
federal court to have federal-question jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
Id.; see also Speciale, 147 F.3d at 614-15 (stating that the well-pleaded

complaint rule "prevents the defendant from controlling the litigation and
obtaining a transfer to federal court by federal preemption when the
defendant raises a federal question in the responsive pleadings").
161. See Speciale, 147 F.3d at 617 (remanding a federal case to state court
for adjudication of liens incidental to a state law tort action).
162. See Sanders, 816 F.Supp. at 1347 (applying the make whole doctrine as
default federal common law); see also Schultz v. NEPCO Employees Mut.
Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 441, 445-46 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
the federal common law make-whole rule applied to an ERISA plan which

failed to set forth first dollar priority rules for third party settlements); see
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of benefits paid, counsel for the beneficiary should contend that it
failed to expressly assert superiority over other liens or to
repudiate state law doctrines governing lien adjudication.
Several Seventh Circuit decisions have refused to enforce an
ERISA subrogation lien because the plan language failed to
expressly require first dollar priority over all other liens.'63 The
Seventh Circuit has also upheld the common fund doctrine when
an ERISA plan failed to expressly require its participants to either
pay their own attorney fees, hire an attorney waiving the common
fund doctrine, or remit the gross rather than the net recovery."' If
it is determined that the plan language does not specifically
require first dollar priority or fails to disclaim common law
doctrines," 5 the ERISA plan's subrogation rights may be
suppressed.
B

Determine Whether the Plan'sSubrogationRights Apply

It must be determined whether the ERISA plan's subrogation
rights apply to the particular nature of recovery. An automobile
collision victim may recover directly from the offending motorist,
and/or from his or her own insurance via uninsured or
underinsured coverage. A plan may limit subrogation to proceeds
collected from "a party that caused the injury.' 66 If the proceeds
also Ninaus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 584,N.W.2d 545, 551 (Wis. Ct.

App. 1998) (stating that the default application of the make whole doctrine
was not inconsistent with other cases in which there is an absence of a first
dollar priority clause in the policy language).
163. See Blackburn, 115 F.3d at 496 (stating that an ERISA plan would have
had a better argument for enforcing its subrogation rights if it expressly
required participants to pay their own legal fees); see also Wells, 213 F.3d at

402 (upholding the common fund doctrine where the ERISA plan failed to
expressly repudiate it); see also discussion supra note 161 (citing Sanders and
Schultz as cases that applied the make whole doctrine by default where the
ERISA plan failed to expressly provide for first dollar priority).

164. Blackburn, 115 F.3d at 496.
165. Accord Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the make whole doctrine applies where ERISA plan does not
expressly disavow it); see also Ford & Harrsion, LLP, supra note 59 (listing
"Disclaim the 'make whole' doctrine in your plan" as the number one
affirmative step plan administrators should take to enforce ERISA
subrogation).
166. See Employers Health Ins. Co. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 469 N.W.2d 172,
177 (Wis. 1991) (holding that the language in a health insurance policy
providing for subrogation against any "responsible third party" was
insufficient to allow subrogation against the proceeds of a uninsured motorist

policy, because the uninsured motorist carrier was not an insurer of the
tortfeasor, and, hence, was not "responsible"); but see Dailey v. Secura Ins.,
476 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the language in a
health insurance policy providing for subrogation against "any party who may
be liable" was broad enough to include an uninsured motorist carrier).

Although these cases did not involve ERISA plans, there is no reason to
believe the same arguments, analysis, and decisions could not be made against
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come from the victim's own uninsured motorist policy, such plan
will have no claim because the uninsured motorist carrier
obviously did not cause the injury.'
Attorneys should also be aware of which party is bound by the
If the language binds only the employee
plan language.
provided to members of his family may be
benefits
personally, any
This is important for
subrogation."
of
plan
reach
beyond the
subrogation claims
ERISA
with
attorneys to realize when dealing
employee.
individual
than
the
other
to
people
for benefits paid
from
immunity
a
qualified
has
recognized
Illinois
Further,
subrogation liens for minors extending to ERISA subrogation
claims. 9 This rule is based on a statute holding parents of an
injured minor responsible for the minor's medical expenses.'7 0
Thus, the parents, not the minor, benefit from payments for
medical expenses by the ERISA plan. 7 ' Subrogation liens against
a minor are deemed invalid because the payments were not made
to or on behalf of the minor. 72 Hence, the ERISA plan cannot
recover its payments from the minor or the minor's estate.'
their subrogation interests as well.
167. See Employers Health, 469 N.W.2d at 177 (holding that the ERISA plan
did not have a right to enforce subrogation against proceeds recovered under
an uninsured motorist policy, as they were not proceeds collected from the
tortfeasor).
168. See Wahl v. N. Telecom, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 235, 242-43 (E.D. Wis. 1989)
(holding that an ERISA plan's language, entitling the plan to subrogation if
the employee received any benefits from the plan, was insufficient to enforce
subrogation rights against the employee's minor daughter). The employee
signed the ERISA plan agreement that required him to "promptly repay the
employee benefit plan if and when [he] receive[d] payment(s) for the injury or
sickness from or on behalf of the responsible person." Id. at 242. The court
noted that the employee's daughter had never signed the contract and that
only she had received benefits from the plan. Id. at 242-43. The court
concluded that the ERISA plan had no contractual right to subrogation and to
enforce subrogation against the employee's daughter would essentially change
the contract, which the court was not prepared to do. Id. at 243.
169. See Klem v. Mann, 665 N.E.2d 514, 517 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (stating that
"[a] firm line of [Illinois] appellate cases [have] established the rule that
subrogation liens against recoveries received by minors' estates are not
valid.").
170. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/15(a)(1) (2000) (stating that "[tihe
expenses of the family ...shall be chargeable upon the property of both
husband and wife. . . .").

This statute is referred to as the Family Expense

Act. Klem, 665 N.E.2d at 517
171. See Klem, 665 N.E.2d at 517 (stating that since the parents are
responsible for making medical payments, it is they who receive the benefit
ERISA plan payments).
172. Id.
173. Id.; see Estate of Aimone v. Health Benefit Plan, 619 N.E.2d 185, 187
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding insurer's subrogation lien against recoveries made
by a minor's estate invalid because it was the parents who benefited from the
medical expense payments, not the minor or the minor's estate); see also
Kelleher v. Hood, 605 N.E.2d 1018, 1022-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that
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One exception to this rule entitles a plan to subrogation
against a minor's recovery from the tortfeasor. The exception
exists when a minor, or his/her parents on his/her behalf,
manifests an intent for the minor to become a third-party
beneficiary of the plan.'74 This occurs when a minor, or his/her
parent on his/her behalf, signs a plan contract agreeing to
reimburse the plan to the extent of benefits provided. 7'
C

Look for a Conflict Between the PlanLanguage and SPD

ERISA plans must provide participants with a summary plan
description ("SPD"). 7' These SPDs provide a synopsis of the actual
plan language to inform the beneficiary of both contracting parties'
rights. 7' The actual plan language should be compared to the
language used in the SPD.
Recent changes to the federal
regulations now require
SPDs
to explain subrogation and
78
reimbursement rights.
A Wisconsin court of appeals noted, in Ninaus v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., that if the terms of the SPD and a plan
conflict, the document favoring the participant governs. 7' In that
case, the SPD "precluded subrogation unless the insured [was]
'made whole'."" ° However, the SPD included a disclaimer that the
actual plan language governed the nature and extent of benefits."'
The court held that "when terms of an [SPD] and policy conflict,

an ERISA plan's subrogation lien against a minor's settlement proceeds is

invalid because medical expenses paid on behalf of the minor are deemed to
benefit the parents, not the minor); see also Estate of Woodring v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 389 N.E.2d 211, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that an
insurer's subrogation lien is invalid against a minor's settlement proceeds

because the minor's estate has not received any benefit from the payment of
medical expenses).
174. See Sosin v. Hayes, 630 N.E.2d 969, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding

that the insurer's subrogation lien against the minor's estate was valid
because the minor's mother assigned her rights to reimbursement for medical

expenses to the minor, thereby making the minor a third-party beneficiary to
payments made under the policy).
175. Id.; see also In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d 605, 606 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) (upholding an ERISA plan's subrogation lien against a minor's
settlement proceeds because the minor was "named as a covered dependent

under his father's health plan

...

," and "the parties manifested their intent" to

make the minor a third-party beneficiary).
176. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102 (2001).

177. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2 (2001); see also THOMPSON PUBLISHING GROUP
supra note 14 (stating that "[SPDs] must clearly explain a plan's
subrogation ...

rights.").

178. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(k)(1)(2001).
179. See Ninaus, 584 N.W.2d at 550 (holding that when terms of an SPD

conflict with the actual plan language, the terms that favor the participant
will govern).
180. Id. at 547.
181. Id. at 548.
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the terms which favor the participant will govern, regardless of
disclaimers (read or unread) or detrimental reliance." 182 The court
found the conflict sufficient to extinguish the ERISA plan's
subrogation rights since the plaintiff was not made whole by the
88
settlement in her underlying tort action.
Subsequently, an Indiana appellate court issued a similar
decision."" In United of Omaha v. Hieber, the court held that an
ERISA plan may be bound to the terms of the SPD when the latter
conflicts with the plan language, upon a showing of detrimental
The court added the element of
reliance upon the SPD."'
detrimental reliance to the beneficiary's burden of proof. Thus,
counsel must ask beneficiaries for all the plan documents they
relied on, as well as the actual plan, when confronted with ERISA
subrogation.
D

Measure the Administrator'sDiscretion

The administrator's discretion to interpret the plan must be
assessed. The United States Supreme Court has determined that
a deferential standard of review is appropriate where the plan
administrator has discretionary authority to construe plan
terms. 8 In such instances, the court limits review to an abuse of
discretion standard.187 However, if the plan fails to expressly
confer such discretion to the administrator, a de novo standard of
review may apply."
The Seventh Circuit has ruled that ERISA does not
unconstitutionally delegate authority to preempt state law to plan
administrators where first dollar recovery contravenes the make
whole doctrine.1 89 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the

182. Id. at 550 (quoting Springs Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 885
F.Supp.1131, 1139-42 (S.D.Ind. 1993).
183. Id. at 547.
184. See United of Omaha v. Hieber, 698 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Ind. App. Ct.

1998) (stating that when a beneficiary detrimentally relies on the SPD's
subrogation language, and the SPD conflicts with the ERISA plan language,
the ERISA plan is bound to the SPD).

185. Id.
186. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 111 (holding that "[T]rust principles make a
deferential standard of review appropriate when a trustee exercises
discretionary powers.").
187. Id. at 111-12; see also Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that where a plan empowers a trustee or administrator to
interpret the plan, the court can only overturn that person's determination by
finding abuse of discretion).
188. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112.

189. See Land v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 25 F.3d 509, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1994)
(dismissing a participant's claim that ERISA unconstitutionally delegates
congressional authority to plan administrators by permitting them to, in
essence, determine what laws will govern employee benefit plans). The court
concluded that ERISA plans are contracts between private parties, and that
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make whole doctrine where the ERISA plan vested discretion in
the plan administrator.'
The Seventh Circuit held that the plan
administrator was not unreasonable in interpreting the plan
language to disclaim the make whole doctrine.'
Other courts
within the Seventh Circuit have followed this approach 9' that
significantly impairs a beneficiary's opportunity to bar ERISA
subrogation. Nevertheless, attorneys should take advantage of
ERISA plans that fail to confer discretion to the plan
administrator.
CONCLUSION

Today, ERISA subrogation affects many personal injury
claims. To effectively handle them, lawyers must know and
understand ERISA. If not timely detected or recognized, ERISA
subrogation will create financial hardship for clients and their
lawyers.9 3
Attorneys must be ready to deal with ERISA
subrogation claims when presented, and be able to intelligently
inform clients of their effects. If handled appropriately, ERISA
subrogation will not constitute a complete bar to recovering first
dollar proceeds for a tort victim. This Comment seeks to provide a
valuable recipe of strategies for coping with ERISA subrogation
within the Seventh Circuit.

ERISA specifically refrained from dictating the substantive content of such
plans. Id.
190. See Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1298-99 (stating that the court was fortunate it
did not have to decide whether to apply the make whole doctrine on the merits
of the rule because it was bound to a deferential standard of review). Since
the plan expressly conferred discretion to the plan administrator, the court
concluded that it was not unreasonable for the plan administrator to interpret
the plan as barring application of the make whole doctrine. Id. at 1299.
191. Id.
192. See Bruzas v. Quezada-Garcia, 642 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002) (affording substantial deference to the administrator's interpretation of
the plan and enforcing the plan's subrogation rights); see also Newport News
Shipbuilding, 523 N.W.2d at 272-73 (holding that an ERISA plan vested
discretion in the trustees to interpret the plan, and since the plan was
interpreted as granting first dollar priority in a subrogation claim, the state
make-whole rule was trumped); see also Siska v. Travelers, 467 N.W.2d 174,
178-79 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that an ERISA plan giving authority to

the plan administrator to construe the plan provisions is reviewable only by an
arbitrary and capricious standard).
193. Neil, supra note 1, at 54.

